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The Global Mobility Divide: 
How visa policies have evolved over time 
(date of acceptance 5 January 2015, published: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 
41, No. 8, pp. 1192-1213) 
 
 
How powerful is your passport? More than a simple grant of 
access into a country, passports and the visas they contain are a 
reflection of geopolitics, the relationship between two nations, 
and a country’s stature relative to the rest of the world…  
(Huffington Post 06/30/2014) 
 
Abstract 
While visa policies are the major instrument for regulating and controlling the global flow of 
people, little is known about how they have changed over time. Accordingly, scholars have 
expressed the need for large-N datasets which cover more than one point in time. This article 
takes up this challenge and presents a for the first time a global overview of the changes in 
visa waiver policies based on a newly created database containing the visa waiver policies of 
over 150 countries for 1969 and 2010. We find that, on average, visa-free mobility has in-
creased over the past 40 years. However, not everybody has benefited from these develop-
ments. In fact, visa waivers are increasingly unequally divided: While citizens of OECD 
countries and rich countries have gained mobility rights, mobility rights for other regions have 
stagnated or even diminished, in particular for citizens from African countries. Overall, we 
find a clear bifurcation in mobility rights, leading to a ‘global mobility divide’. 
 
Keywords: Database, Mobility, OECD, Visa policies, Visa Waivers 
  




Globalisation is usually understood as an increase and intensification of cross-border transac-
tions (French 2000; Held et al. 1999, Spiro 2008). It has been suggested that the “importance 
of space and territorial boundaries declines” (Spiro 2008: 4) and the model of the state as a 
‘container’ is under erosion (Beck 1997, 2007; Held et al. 1999; Sassen 1996, 2006; Zürn 
1998). Indeed, there is a clear increase in the cross-border mobility of goods, capital, services, 
information and people over time. However, it is clear that the rationale and policy implica-
tions of cross-border movement of people differ and that an increase in numbers does not 
necessarily need to mean a loss in control capacity. Border and control policies surrounding 
the mobility of people are highly sensitive and contested policy domains and stand in stark 
contrast to other policy domains, where the trend of de-bordering is relatively clear. While 
migration policies have received considerable attention from comparative researchers, much 
less is known about global shifts in border policies dealing with short term mobility, which 
represents the bulk of cross-border movement of people. However, the study of visa regimes 
is of utmost interest to migration research, as restrictions in this area are directly related to 
states’ attempts to control immigration.  
 
The question of how visa regimes have developed over time is heavily under-researched and 
remains almost a “virgin subject for academic research” (Whyte 2008: 132).  With this article 
we seek to answer the following questions: Have borders become more open or more restric-
tive over time for short-term travellers? Have mobility opportunities been enhanced for all 
groups of citizens or only for a few? And, if so, which groups do benefit? While these are 
straightforward questions, they have not yet been answered. We attempt to address these 
questions by looking at the evolution of visa waiver policies on a global level. We view visa 
waiver policies as the major strategy for fostering desired forms of mobility and controlling or 
hindering less desired ones. Citizens who enjoy visa-free travel to another country can be 
considered ‘trusted travellers’ who encounter zero or low levels of control, whereas those who 
still require visas are tightly controlled.  
 
Based on a new dataset, the Visa Network Data, which contains information on global visa 
waiver programmes from 1969 and 2010, we provide an account of how visa policies have 
evolved over a 40 year period. Unlike previous studies which mostly considered visa regimes 
with a larger scope at a single point in time only, we analyse and compare visa regimes at two 
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points in time. For every country in the sample we collected data on how many and which 
other states are exempt from visa obligations. Because we are discovering new territory and 
presenting data from a newly established dataset for the first time, our analysis remains large-
ly descriptive. However, our article allows some of the core theses and debates in this field 
which previously lacked empirical foundation to be addressed. 
 
2. Globalisation, Mobility, Visa Policies 
The issues of mobility of people and the organization of border control feature prominently in 
globalisation literature (Albert and Brock 1998; Anderson 2000; Sassen 2006). However, 
despite significant increases in travel and cross-border mobility, eminent scholars assume that 
“mobility remains a scarce resource” (Bauman 2002: 83) and that the mobility of persons 
does not follow general globalisation trends.
1
 It has been predicted that enhanced 
opportunities to move will apply neither universally nor uniformly across the globe, and we 
are witnessing the emergence of a new system of stratification built on an unequal access to 
mobility rights (e.g. Bauman 2002; Shamir 2005; Beck 2007). Shamir (2005: 200) claims that 
“the differential ability to move in space – and even more so to have access to opportunities 
for movements – has become a major stratifying force in the global social hierarchy.” If this is 
true, one could justifiably speak of a new and global ‘mobility divide’ (analogous to the 
‘digital divide’). 
 
A group of scholars interested in concrete processes of re-bordering have posited that borders 
increasingly differentiate between ‘worthy’ or ‘trusted’ travellers and those considered ‘not 
trusted’ or ‘risky’ (see e.g. Torpey 2000; Rygiel 2008; Walters 2006). They assume that states 
tend to enforce a tougher selection across these two categories and thereby serve their dual 
interests in both openness and closure. Here, border selectivity is seen as a central reaction to 
the opportunities and risks stemming from globalisation and the increase in overall mobility. 
The underlying idea is to prevent unwanted people possibly presenting a threat to the security, 
wealth or identity of the country from entering. Among these unwanted people are “potential-
ly violent demonstrators, criminals, hooligans and terrorists, but also people seeking political 
asylum, people who have already been rejected, and potential illegal immigrants, and even 
culturally distinct groups, poor travellers and those who do not promise any benefits” ([name 
                                                          
1The concept of ‘mobility citizenship’ ([name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]; Urry 
1990) is an attempt to capture the role of rights related to mobility more thoroughly, distinguishing the ‘right to 
move’from the ‘right to stay’, with the first reflecting mobility in a broader sense and the second relating to 
migration/immigration. 
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deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]). Most often, very heterogeneous 
‘threats’ are conflated when speaking of ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ migration (Ceyhan 2005).  
 
In general, nation states insist on their right to decide whether a person may enter and stay in 
the country and the “regulation of movement contributes to constitute the very ‘state-ness’ of 
states” (Torpey 1998: 240). Visa policies can be seen as the central instrument of mobility 
restriction and control concerning the vast majority of cross-border movements. People nor-
mally apply for a visa in their home country at an embassy or consulate affiliated with their 
destination country and must provide personal information to be eligible for a visa. The un-
derlying idea of requiring people to have a visa before entering a country is clearly one of 
‘remote control’ (Zolberg, 2006: 443) or ‘pre-emptive mobility governance’ (Broeders and 
Hampshire 2013) by which states try to prevent people from approaching the territory or start-
ing their journey without prior permission. Requiring a visa allows states to exercise exterrito-
rial control in the sense that the encounter between the control agency and potential border-
crossers already takes place in the countries of origin. There, destination countries still not 
face any legal responsibilities for potential visitors, immigrants or asylum seekers yet ([name 
deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]). Moreover, exterritorial control is 
advantageous for destination countries since they can involve private actors in control activi-
ties. For example, the transport business can function as a control agent when destination 
countries urge airlines and shipping companies to control for passports and visas before em-
barkation (Bigo and Guild 2005; Salter 2010). However, visa restrictions are also costly: they 
carry an administrative burden and require personnel. Additionally, they might hinder and 
deter the kind of mobility which countries desire for economic reasons. For example, as 
Neumayer (2011) has shown, by raising travel costs and deterring unwanted visitors, visa re-
strictions can be harmful to foreign investment and trade flows. Moreover, travel and tourism 
make up a substantial share of the global economy, now equating to 9.5 percent of total GDP, 
1 in 11 of the world’s total jobs, 4.4 percent of total investment and 5.4 percent of global ex-
ports.
2
 Hence, visa restrictions may substantially hinder states in reaping the benefits of eco-
nomic globalization. 
 
One can argue that in the era of globalisation states face two conflicting demands, namely the 
need for speedy border crossings for desired forms of mobility and tough control and deter-
rence for unwanted travellers. Hence, a general visa policy seems to be ineffective, if not 
                                                          
2
 (accessed July 20, 2014). 
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problematic. Therefore, states have launched visa waiver policies for citizens of a number of 
countries, who are entitled to enter a territory without prior permission. This group of people 
benefits from visa waivers because of the passports they hold. Hence, passports have unequal 
power, as the headnote at the beginning of our article suggests. The holder of a particular 
passport not only enjoys rights related to their country of citizenship but also acquires a cer-
tain status within the global mobility regime.
3
 Still, for the majority of citizens still face visa 
restrictions (or enjoys visa waivers) based on their nationality for most destinations. 
 
The attraction of mobility rights related to a certain passport even makes it one central motive 
for changing citizenship (Wunderlich 2005; Witte [forthcoming]). Moreover, some countries 
have launched programmes for the acquisition of visas or passports of high mobility power. 
Upon payment or generous investments in the country, these countries offer either limited 
permission to stay or full citizenship to wealthy people who wish to enhance their individual 
mobility rights. For example, Portugal sells its ‘golden visas’ for an initial period of one year.4 
Malta even offers a ‘golden passport’ to private individuals if they invest at least 1.15 million 
euros and have lived in the country for at least one year.
5
 Citizenship-by-investment pro-
grammes particularly highlight the alleged benefit of having a ‘high power passport’. Henley 
& Partners, a private company specializing in so-called ‘international residence and citizen-
ship planning’ for wealthy clients, have a very telling statement on their website:  
 
A person of talent and means need not limit his or her life and business to only one 
country. Making an active decision with regard to your residence and citizenship gives 
you more personal freedom, privacy and security.
6[…] In today's globalized world, vi-
sa restrictions play an important role in controlling the movement of foreign nationals 
across borders. Almost all countries now require visas from certain non-nationals who 
wish to enter their territory. Visa requirements are also an expression of the relation-
                                                          
3
 Besides, some states have invented so called ‘trusted traveller programs’ as the US did with the SENTRI pro-
gram (for Mexicans) and the GLOBAL ENTRY program (for example for own, Dutch, Mexican and South Ko-
rean citizens). Travellers from these countries can apply for the status of a “pre-approved, low-risk traveller”. 
After a rigorous security check and interview, clearance can be given. Trusted travellers, mostly frequent travel-
lers and businesspersons, can identify themselves at the border (e.g. by fingerprint verification at a kiosk) and 




13108347.html (accessed August 25, 2014). 
5
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25959458 (accessed August 25, 2014). 
6
http://www.henleyglobal.com/residence/overview/ (accessed October 23, 2009) 
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ships between individual nations, and generally reflect the relations and status of a 




These policy programmes fuel the debate amongst migration scholars on questions of justice, 
fairness and transparency. Some scholars emphasize the role of the ‘golden passport’ pro-
grammes by arguing that, today, “the primary value of citizenship lies in the mobility rights 
attached to passports” (Shachar and Bauböck 2014: 1). 
 
Over the last decade, research has made important progress by developing indices for migra-
tion policies, citizenship and integration and building extensive comparative datasets (e.g. 
Gest et al. 2014; Helbling 2013; Koopmans 2013; Ruhs 2013; Niessen and Huddleston 2009). 
However, this trend towards collecting and comparing indicators related to migration, citizen-
ship and integration has largely neglected the issue of short-term mobility and visa policies. 
This is surprising as short-term mobility is closely linked to migration on at least two levels. 
First, “contemporary migration often begins as tourism, study visits or temporary work 
abroad” (Koslowski 2004: 4). In other words, those who come with a long-term perspective 
have often visited the destination country previously on a short-term basis and thereby probed 
into other countries, expanded their networks, visited friends and family and made themselves 
familiar with future opportunities related to migration plans. Accordingly, research has shown 
that the introduction and removal of visa requirements has an effect on the timing and volume 
of migration. Visa restrictions, for example, reduce immigration, but may also encourage 
long-term settlement and decrease circular migration, so that the immigration-reducing effect 
is partly counterbalanced (Czaika and de Haas 2014). Secondly, short-term mobility is also a 
central entry channel for irregular immigration, mainly through visa overstaying. In other 
words, people may arrive legally but then stay on after their visa has expired, so that states 
reluctance to grant a visa is often a form of precaution. In fact, the majority of irregular immi-
grants present in the OECD today entered their country legally but overstayed their visa 
(Clandestino Project 2009; Guild 2001). Hence, next to general security concerns the (as-
sumed) willingness to return – established by personal documents and interviews – is a strong 
criterion for visa issuance or denial. Therefore, when issuing a visa many destination coun-
tries put much effort into scrutinising an applicant’s intent to return. For example, applicants 
for a Schengen visa have to give proof of a regular source of income or a work contract in 
                                                          
7
http://www.henleyglobal.com/citizenship/visa-restrictions/ (accessed October 23, 2009)  
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their home country. Interviews with applicants on their family status and other personal cir-
cumstances are supposed to help consular officers to assess the likelihood that they return 
before their visa expires ([name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]). 
Countries which have been observed to send a high share of visa-overstayers are often ex-
empted from visa waiver programmes (Siskin 2004: 2).  
 
Some recent pioneering studies have dealt with visa policies either on a European or global 
level (Neumayer 2006, 2011; Hobolth 2014; [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the 
review process]; Whyte 2008), but they are mostly cross-sectional in nature and thus do not 
allow an understanding of long-term trends or changes over time. Very few studies scrutinise 
changes over time; those that do look at a handful of selected OECD cases ([name deleted to 
maintain the integrity of the review process]) or are limited to a subset of countries. Czaika 
and de Haas (2014), for example, traced 38 destination countries between 1973 and 2012 to 
measure when these countries introduced or waived visa requirements. So what do we know 
from the few existing studies on visa policies? Cross-sectional evidence suggests that there is 
indeed a global hierarchy of visa freedom ([name deleted to maintain the integrity of the re-
view process]; Neumayer 2006; Whyte 2008). Poor countries and those with dictatorial re-
gimes or civil conflict have been found to face higher mobility barriers, while OECD coun-
tries seem to be privileged (Neumayer 2006; Whyte 2008: 132; [name deleted to maintain the 
integrity of the review process]; Finotelli and Sciortino 2013). Moreover, OECD countries 
disproportionally benefit from visa waiver programmes, while they tend to impose visa re-
strictions on other countries outside of the OECD world (Neumayer 2006). The strongest re-
strictions have been imposed upon countries expected to produce potential illegal immigrants 
and which are known as refugee sending countries or countries sending larger numbers of 
visa-overstayers. According to Siskin (2004), to qualify for the maintenance of visa-waived 
travel for their citizens in the US, countries need to maintain a ‘disqualification rate’ of below 
2 percent, i.e. less than 2 percent of national passport holders must have violated the entry 
conditions. On the other hand, bilateral trade and cultural and commonwealth links have been 
found to positively affect visa relations (Neumayer 2006; O’Byrne 2001). Moreover, tourist 
destinations have been found to be particularly open towards citizens from high-income coun-
tries (O’Byrne 2001).  
 
The following novel analysis will move beyond a purely cross-sectional view and focus on 
four main issues which are central to the debate. First, we ask whether there has been an over-
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all increase in visa waivers over time as suggested by single case studies ([name deleted to 
maintain the integrity of the review process]). Second, we will look at gains and potential 
losses in visa-free travel, by separating the OECD-world from the other countries and study-
ing them from a longitudinal perspective. Third, we differentiate between continents with the 
aim of providing valuable insights into the global clustering of the changes found. Related to 
this issue, the fourth section provides an overview of the top and bottom ten countries in 
terms of benefitting from visa free waivers in 1969 and 2010. We investigate whether rank-
ings have changed and, if so, who the winners and losers of this change are. 
 
3. The Visa Network Data 
Our data on visa waiver policies come from the Travel Information Manual (TIM), issued 
monthly by the International Air Transportation Association (IATA) since 1963. This hand-
book compiles authoritative information on visa obligations used by airlines and travel agen-
cies concerning travel requirements (i.e. passport, visa, health) of all sovereign states. Airlines 
are the main users of this data, to comply with existing laws and regulations and to avoid car-
rier sanctions, so the level of accuracy can be regarded as very high. We are able to cover two 
points in time, namely the years 1969 and 2010. While 2010 tells us something about the re-
cent global visa patterns, we have chosen 1969 because at the beginning of the 1970s coun-
tries started to readjust their visa policies in response to symptoms of globalisation, including 
migration. From single case studies we know that visa waiver programmes were expanding 
before this period (i.e. including more and more countries), while after this period a kind of 
sorting can be observed, meaning that some countries which had previously benefitted from 
visa waiver policies were now excluded and new ones admitted ([name deleted to maintain 
the integrity of the review process]). Moreover, the frequency of visa introductions and re-
movals increased throughout the 1970s, and since then visa policies “have played an increas-
ingly important role in preventing people from certain countries entering a national territory” 
(Czaika and de Haas 2014: 8). Other historical events might have played a role too, like the 
oil shocks in the 1970s, growing unemployment in the OECD world, or the changing ap-
proach towards ‘guest workers’ in Western Europe – all leading to a more proactive use of 
visa policies to regulate mobility. Thus, comparing 1969 and 2010 covers the major reorder-
ing period for visa waiver policies. 
 
The current version of the TIM can be ordered online, but acquiring an archived version 
proved difficult. We eventually contacted the IATA office in the Netherlands (IATA Nether-
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lands Data Publication in Amsterdam) who allowed us to make a photocopy of the original 
archive version from 1969. The TIM has a section on every country worldwide, indicating 
from which countries and under which circumstances (duration of travel, costs, necessary 
documents providing identification, exceptions for special groups for diplomats, expats etc.) 
travellers may enter without a visa. From this we coded the relation between the respective 
country and any other. Those cases were defined as visa freedom if normal tourists and busi-
ness people were allowed to approach the country without an application procedure before 
departure and stay in the country for at least 90 days, which is a standard for a tourist visa. 
We used the information for December of each year and entered the information manually 
into the database. Thus, the dataset for each year is basically a cross table with over 150 coun-
tries in columns and the same set of countries in rows. This results in a socio-matrix of visa 
freedom relations, with every country case being a possible sender and receiver of a visa 
waiver agreement. In doing so, we treat destination countries the same as emigration coun-
tries, taking into account that these roles can change over time. We collected data at the state 
level, i.e. whether state A lifted visa obligations for the citizens of state B (coded as 1) or not 
(coded as 0). If two states do not agree on a visa waiver, border-crossers have to apply for a 
visa even for visits that do not exceed three months.
8
 For each of the over 150 countries in the 




We excluded very small states (e.g. Andorra), small island states (e.g. Tuvalu) and countries 
with an unsettled international status in 2010 (e.g. Kosovo). Very small countries and island 
states are rarely destination countries for global mobility and hardly capable of administering 
exterritorial control (visa are often issued at the border). As they cannot afford fully fledged 
visa procedures in their embassies they tend to have uniform regulations for every other coun-
try, i.e. either giving visa freedom to all countries or to none. For 2010, we coded 166 states. 
In a second step, we tried to track the information for these countries for 1969, which was 
possible for 155 states. The difference stems from states that did not exist in 1969 (e.g. Bang-
ladesh), states that became independent or reunited (e.g. Germany) or simply missing data 
(e.g. for Mongolia). The generally higher number of countries included in both samples is 
partly due to coding all former member states of the USSR and Yugoslavia as single states in 
                                                          
8
In the dataset a visa waiver is defined as a directed positive relation from one state to any other. This way, we 
can distinguish between no relation between two states, one-sided relations and mutual relations. This is of ut-
most importance, since it would be wrong to assume that bilateral visa policies are mainly reciprocal ([name 
deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]). Moreover, such data is relational and allows for social 
network analysis. 
9
 For questions concerning the database please consult [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review 
process]. 
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1969 as well. The complete dataset consists of 3,767 data points for 1969 and 5,392 for 2010, 
and thus has an unprecedented global coverage.
10
 For each country, visa-free travel possibili-
ties to over 150 other countries are defined allowing us to give a comprehensive account of 




4. Changes in Visa Waiver Policies 
4.1 Expansion of Visa Waivers? 
While the invention of the passport and visa system is historically speaking a rather recent 
development, one which can be seen as part of the “monopolisation of the legitimate means of 
movement” by modern states (see Torpey 2000), after World War II it developed into a com-
prehensive and almost universal system of mobility control and regulation. However, pro-
cesses of globalisation (we refer here to the so-called third wave of globalisation starting dur-
ing the 1980s), i.e. increased mobility activities, greater connectedness across borders and 
processes of re-bordering, have put this system under pressure. As mentioned above, we as-
sume that visa waivers have become more popular over time, thanks to states’ interests in 
mobility and the dysfunctional aspects of a universal visa requirement. By implication, this 
means that the number of visa waivers should have increased and, thus, possibilities for visa-
free travel should have expanded.  
 
Indeed, as Table 1 shows, the average number of possibilities for visa-free travel (per pass-
port) has increased from 24 in 1969 to 32 in 2010.
12
 The increase is substantial, but modest. 
Given the number of countries in the sample, it is possible to calculate the maximum possible 
number of visa waiver programmes and relate this to the number of empirically observed pro-
grammes. This measure is called network density. It increased from 0.16 in 1969 to 0.20 in 
2010, indicating a world becoming somehow more closely connected in terms of freedom of 
movement. While there is an overall increase in visa-free travel possibilities, the standard de-
viation also increased (1969: 17.9; 2010: 27.8), indicating an increased stratification of asso-
ciated mobility rights. 
                                                          
10
To our knowledge, the most extensive study in terms of time coverage is the DEMIG VISA project that is 
currently working on a dataset for the period 1973-2012. However, that dataset only covers 38 selected destina-
tion countries (Czaika and de Haas 2014). 
11
 This dataset was complemented with secondary data on GDP per capita (PPP, power purchase parity, from the 
Penn World Table) and the Polity-IV index measuring the level of democratisation, since earlier studies have 
suggested that these are factors explaining a country’s positive visa freedom relations with other countries 
([name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]; Neumayer 2006). However, in particular for 
1969 there is a larger amount of missing data for these macro-indicators. 
12
 This increase also holds if we standardise the sample using the 155 countries from 1969 as the base. 
  11 
 
 




4.2 The Bifurcation of Visa Waivers 
 
However, the increase in average numbers tells us little about the global distribution of visa 
waiver agreements. Figures 1 and 2 provide information on the distribution of possibilities for 
visa-free travel in 1969 and 2010. Additionally, a line indicates the cumulative percentage of 
visa waivers by country. The figures show that in 1969 visa waivers were much less wide-
spread than today. In 1969, citizens of only twenty percent of all countries in the sample could 
travel without a visa in more than 35 countries; in 2010 this was more than 35 percent. Still, 
in 1969 and 2010, values in the range from 16 to 20 (visa exemptions) are most frequent 
(mode 1969: 16; 2010: 17). We also see that in 1969, some countries occupy the middle re-
gion of the distribution, while in 2010 this region is nearly empty. Thus, the figure indicates a 
greater polarisation – if not a bifurcation – of visa-free travel in 2010 than in 1969. We do not 
have a normal distribution or something similar but rather two clusters, one at the lower end 
of the distribution and one concentrated at the upper end. Interestingly, in 1969 only six per-
cent of all countries had over 65 visa waivers. In 2010, this number grew to seventeen per-
cent. The counterpoint is a larger number of countries with few and stagnating opportunities 
for visa waived entry.
13
 Overall, the data tell us that the possibility of visa-free entry is une-
qually divided, a trend which has been reinforced over time. Hence, the promise of globalisa-
tion as the simple creation of greater mobility opportunities for all does not seem to hold. 
Mobility rights based on visa-free travel are instead unequally distributed – a mobility divide 
has indeed intensified over time. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The literature suggests a clear pattern of the apparent mobility divide, with the West or North 
being privileged and the global South being excluded ([name deleted to maintain the integrity 
of the review process]; Neumayer 2006; Whyte 2008). Some even claim that liberal Western 
                                                          
13
See also appendix 1 for further information on the visa freedom of countries. 
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countries have heavily influenced the global mobility regime to their advantage by establish-
ing highly asymmetrical visa relations: “[W]hile liberal states are successful in extending the 
mobility rights of their own citizens far beyond the Western world (if not globally) they do 
little to strengthen or grant these rights for non-rich and non-democratic countries” ([name 
deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]). This thesis leaves open the question 
whether there has always been a hierarchy of unequal mobility rights or whether there is in-
deed a bifurcation in visa-free travel, with the OECD countries being successful in “maximis-
ing their own citizens’ opportunities for visa-free travel” ([name deleted to maintain the integ-
rity of the review process]). 
 
Table 2 provides some evidence by distinguishing the average number of visa free travel for 
OECD member states and non-OECD countries for both samples. For methodological pur-
poses, we base the OECD/non-OECD classification on OECD-membership in 2010.
14
 It is 
striking how much higher OECD-countries and their citizens rank in terms of visa-waived 
travel compared to non-OECD countries. Even though their visa waiver numbers were al-
ready high in the late 1960s, they have managed to increase the number of visa-free travel 
possibilities for their citizens substantially (by 27 on average, in particular those states which 
became OECD-members during that period). By contrast, the large group of non-OECD 





[Table 2 about here] 
 
Still, there is a high standard deviation for the OECD in 1969 and the non-OECD countries in 
2010. For the first case, this can be explained by the coding procedure which uses the OECD 
membership in 2010 as its basis. More interesting is the non-OECD group: Table 3 below 
shows those non-OECD countries with a visa freedom equal to or higher than 60. These are 
the countries of the non-OECD cluster with a relative high number of visa waivers. Interest-
ingly, these countries have a relatively high GDP per capita (PPP) (which rose from $8,324 in 
                                                          
14
 The OECD group contains all member states as of 2010, along with, for the 1969 sample: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
15
 Of course, the groups are still diverse, with a standard deviation of 20.12 for the OECD countries and 10.11 
for non-OECD countries in 1969. For 2010 the standard deviations are 8.17 for OECD countries and 20.20 for 
non-OECD countries, respectively. 
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1969 to $55,838 in 2010), some are democracies and many are part of important bodies of 
regional integration (EU, MERCOSUR). Formally, they might not have been a member of the 
OECD (in 2010), but most of them share important features of countries committed to democ-
racy and market economy. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
4.3 Different Countries, Different Continents, Different Freedoms? 
Having described the general trend of visa policies and their global distribution, the analysis 
now turns to the latter issue by examining the significance of countries and regions (conti-
nents). Figures 3 and 4 depict the possibilities for visa-free travel for all countries in 1969 and 
2010. Black and dark-grey states display high visa freedom, whereas light-grey states have 
only low numbers of visa waivers.
16
 What is most striking is the loss of mobility rights by 
African countries when comparing the two points in time. The winners are North and South 
America as well as the European countries, in particular Eastern Europe, which have been 
able to gain additional visa freedom. Many other countries did not see much change in terms 
of the “power” of their passport.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
These findings are also confirmed by Table 4, which provides information on the average 
number of visa waivers per country by region for 1969 and 2010. The figure is quite revealing 
in several ways: First, it shows that Europe (+23) and the Americas (North: +20
17
; South: 
+18) exhibited the greatest increase in the number of visa waivers. Citizens from those re-
gions have by far the most ‘powerful’ passports in terms of visa-free travel. Conversely, the 
figure illustrates that countries in Asia (+5) and Oceania (+4) were unable to substantially 
increase visa-free travel for their citizens.
18
 Even more striking is the decrease in possibilities 
for visa-free travel for African (-4) countries. While all other continents have gained at least 
some mobility rights, African citizens have lost them. One possible reason is the shift in poli-
cy and attitudes by countries which see themselves as potential recipients of migrants from 
Africa. Indeed, the ‘Wall around the West’ (Andreas and Snyder 2000) is primarily a fence of 
protection against African migrants. Looking more closely at visa policies, case studies reveal 
                                                          
16
For the exact visa freedom of a given country, see appendix 1. 
17
 North America, here, also includes Central American countries. 
18
See footnote 11 for details on Oceania.  
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that in the late 1960s and early 1970s visa policies vis-à-vis African countries were part of 
foreign policy rather than migration control, so that countries from the so-called ‘developing 
world’ also had a chance to benefit from visa waiver agreements. In the case of Austria, for 
example, the majority of agreements with these countries at that time were arranged during 
visits when “Austrian government officials wanted to express their goodwill and had nothing 
else to give” ([name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process]). An increase in 
immigration from these African countries due to relaxed visa obligations was not expected at 
that time. This, obviously, has changed, with the fear of irregular migration from Africa lead-
ing to an exclusion of Africans from enhanced forms of openness. Moreover, European coun-
tries harmonized their visa policies in 2001 and now have a common list of countries from 
which citizens have to apply for a visa before travelling to the EU. While strengthening the 
intra-EU process of policy making, this harmonization might have weakened relations be-
tween African countries and their former colonial powers in Europe. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
4.4 Winners and Losers 
Having identified the unequal distribution of visa waivers in terms of regions and its devel-
opment over time, we ask who the winners and losers are in this new divide (see Figure 5). 
Countries that have shown a gain in mobility rights include former members of the Eastern 
bloc (Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) that are now members of the European Union. 
In some sense, they have become incorporated into the Western group of states. However, 
immediately before the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, many of these countries were exempt-
ed from the visa requirement when travelling to Western Europe (but not in the late 1960s). 
But as the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia did not allow free exit of their own citi-
zens, the openness of the West was merely symbolic. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and increased mobility towards Western Europe, the visa requirement was reintroduced and 
only abolished in the course of EU accession.
19
 Visa waivers, then, represent “a level of trust 
that symbolizes countries’ acceptance in the Western alliance of states” (Ginsburg 2008: 8). 
Furthermore, a group of countries now among the richest in the world managed to establish a 
sizeable number of visa waivers for their citizens. Countries which have lost visa waivers are 
mainly former colonial states and countries in the politically fragile Middle East. Actually, 
                                                          
19
 Accession to the European Union generally goes hand in hand with ratifying the Schengen Agreement that 
demands to open internal borders to the Schengen Area and guarantees freedom of movement within that area. 
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during their time as colonial states or shortly after, many of these states held a higher standing 
than they did in 2010 after having experienced unstable political regimes, poverty, dictator-
ship, and civil wars subsequent to de-colonialisation.  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
The article sets out a new research agenda dealing with global mobility and the worldwide 
distribution of mobility rights. Against the background of the globalisation literature, it was 
argued that states seek to participate in global exchanges, including cross-border mobility of 
persons, but have an ongoing interest in control so that they are impelled to find ways to com-
bine both. We have focused on short-term visa and visa waiver policies as major instruments 
to allow swift border crossings and openness on the one hand and control and mobility deter-
rence on the other.  
 
By presenting a new Visa Network Data with a unique data coverage and giving a descriptive 
overview of changes in visa waiver policies between 1969 and 2010, we have not only estab-
lished highly relevant new insights, we also show how such data can be used and what poten-
tial they have. We find that, overall, visa waiver programmes have significantly increased 
since 1969. However, not everyone benefits from them: While citizens of OECD countries 
can travel visa-free to many parts of the world, those from non-OECD countries are lagging 
behind. At the same time, we find another divide between OECD and non-OECD countries, 
as citizens from Europe and the Americas have gained global mobility rights, while those 
coming from Oceania and Asia have been excluded from this development. Citizens of fragile 
and economically under-developed states in Africa have even lost mobility rights in 2010 
compared to 1969. Hence, we observe an increased global mobility divide over the last 40 
years which fosters inequality between citizens of the ‘Global North’ and the ‘Global South’ 
in terms of mobility rights.  
 
We see our contribution as the start of a larger research endeavour rather than the final word. 
Recent publications (Neumayer 2006; [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review 
process]; Whyte 2008) clearly indicate a rising interest in this topic and we see several possi-
ble avenues for future research. For example, further analysis should seek to establish expla-
nations for the mobility divide we have found in this article and make use of the data’s net-
  16 
 
work structure. Differences in terms of wealth, religion, colonial history or political regime 
might be pertinent factors which could potentially explain this divide. As far as network struc-
ture is concerned, one objective will be to explore the structure and dynamic of the visa rela-
tionships on the basis of country dyads. The role of regional integration worldwide would be 
another worthwhile subject for investigation. It will also be crucial to extend the data collec-
tion to cover more points in time and a longer time period. Notwithstanding the specificity of 
the issue at stake, we see a clear need to establish a link with the wider field of research in 
migration and immigration and not to start a decoupled endeavour limited to ‘mobility ex-
perts’. In our view, mobility and migration are closely interwoven and should necessarily be 
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Appendix 1. 













Albania, Brunei, Cambodia, Como-
ros Islands, Fiji 
Afghanistan, Somalia 
2 
Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Hong 
Kong, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Somalia 
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Myanmar, 
Pakistan 
3 
Afghanistan, Burundi, Indonesia, 
Laos, Nepal, Vietnam 
Comoros Islands, Djibouti (Rep.), 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iraq, 
Laos, Sudan, Timor Leste 
4 
Liberia China, Korea (Peoples Rep.), Vi-
etnam 
5 
Germany (East), Korea (Rep.), 
United Arab Emirates 
Angola, Bhutan, Congo (Kinshasa), 
Egypt (Arab Rep. of), Iran, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan 
6 
Ethiopia, Thailand Bangladesh, Haiti, Lebanon, Syria, 
Yemen Rep. 
7 
Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria Gabon, Indonesia, Jordan, Mozam-
bique 
8 
Egypt (Arab Rep. of), Iraq, Philip-
pines 
Burundi, Mongolia, Rwanda 
9 
Congo (Kinshasa), Guinea 
(Rep.of), Qatar, Rwanda,  
Saudi Arabia 
Cameroon, Cuba, India, Libya, 
Philippines 
10 
Bahrain, Libya Algeria, Congo (Brazzaville), Do-
minican Rep., Thailand 
11 / Chad, Madagascar, Uzbekistan 
12 Cameroon Albania, Central African Rep. 
13 Haiti / 
14 / 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, 
Bosnia Her., Kazakhstan, Morocco, 
Taijikistan, Uganda 
15 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Swaziland, 
Togo 
Kyrgystan, Papua New Guinea 
16 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
China, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, 
Estonia, Gabon, Georgia, Iran, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Madagascar,  
Mali, Moldova, Taijikistan, Turk-
menistan, Ukraine,  
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
Colombia, Georgia, Moldova, Na-
mibia, Oman, Zimbabwe 
17 
Kuwait Belarus, Benin, Guinea- Bissau, 
Guyana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauri-
tania, Togo, Zambia 
18 Benin, Bolivia, Central African Nigeria, Swaziland 
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Rep., Chad, Korea (Peoples Rep.), 
Mauritius 
19 
Burkina Faso, Honduras, Maurita-
nia, Panama 
Burkina Faso, Ecuador, Malawi, 
Mali, Niger, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia 
20 
Dominican Rep., Russia Bahrain, Cote d Ivoire, Fiji, Guinea 
(Rep.of), Kuwait,  
Peru, Senegal, Tanzania 
21 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Paraguay 
Botswana, Kenya, Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates 
22 Israel, Peru, Senegal, South Africa Solomon Islands, Ukraine 
23 / Ghana 
24 
Algeria, Botswana, Colombia, Cote 
d Ivoire, Ecuador 
Jamaica 
25 / / 
26 
Chile, Czech Rep., Hungary, Leso-
tho, Niger, Portugal, Slovak Rep., 
Sri Lanka 
Sierra Leone 
27 Argentina, Brazil, Guyana, Poland Gambia 
28 India, Zambia Russia 
29 / / 
30 Uruguay / 
31 
Bosnia Her., Croatia, Macedonia 
(FYROM), Montenegro, Nigeria, 
Serbia, Slovenia 
/ 
32 Ghana South Africa 
33 
Bulgaria, Japan, Romania, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore 
Trinidad Tobago 







Malaysia, Tanzania, Trinidad To-
bago 
/ 
37 / / 
38 Malta / 
39 / / 
40 Gambia, Pakistan / 
41 Turkey / 
42 New Zealand / 
43 Tunisia Serbia 
44 Cyprus Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro 
45 / / 
46 / / 
47 Iceland Nicaragua 
48 Australia, Austria, USA / 
49 / Honduras 
50 / El Salvador, Guatemala 
51 / / 
52 Spain / 
53 / Mauritius 
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54 Canada Panama 
55 Ireland / 
56 / Costa Rica, Paraguay, Venezuela 
57 / Brunei 
58 / / 
59 / / 
60 / / 
61 / Uruguay 
62 / Croatia, Mexico 
63 Finland / 
64 / Malaysia 
65 Italy, Switzerland Hong Kong 
66 / Brazil 
67 Belgium, Luxembourg Bulgaria, Chile 
68 France Hungary, Latvia 
69 Germany (West) Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania 
70 
Netherland, Norway Czech Rep., Israel, Poland, Slovak 
Rep. 
71 / Australia, Romania 
72 / 
Cyprus, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Slovenia 
73 Denmark Korea (Rep.) 
74 Sweden / 
75 / Canada, Greece, Portugal 
76 United Kingdom Austria, Iceland, Malta, Spain 
77 / France, Japan, Switzerland, USA 
78 / 
Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, 
United Kingdom (GB) 
79 / 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg 
80 / Denmark, Sweden 
81 / / 
82 / Ireland 
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Tables and Figures 
Tables: 
 
Table 1. Average number of visa-free travel possibilities and density of visa relations 
(1969/2010)  
 
Visa Network Data, 1969 
(N=155) 




Visa-free Travel (Ø) 24,30 32,48 (33.57) 
Minimum 1 1 (1) 
Maximum 76 82 (80) 
Density 0.16 0.20 (0.22) 
 
Table 2. Average number of visa-free travel possibilities by OECD and non-OECD countries 
(1969/2010)  
 Visa-free Travel Ø (Std. Dev.) 
 1969 2010 
Non-OECD 18,06 (11.06) 21.91 (20.12) 
OECD 46.53 (19.82) 73.53 (8.05) 
 
Table 3.Non-OECD countries with a visa-free travel possibilities ≥ 60 (2010) 
Non-OECD Countries with a visa-free travel 



















                                                          
20
 In brackets we supply information on a network with N=154 which only entails visa relations for countries 
that are also present in 1969 (with the exception of East Germany). 
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Table 4. Average number of visa-free travel possibilities by continents (1969/2010)
21
 
 Visa-free Travel Possibilities Ø (Std. Dev.) 
 1969 2010 
Africa 18.57 (11.34) 14.56 (9.09) 
Asia 13.90 (10.98) 18.93 (22.34) 
Europe 40.27 (21.45) 63.65 (21.25) 
North America 25.21 (12.42) 43.00 (22.45) 
Oceania 30.33 (20.89) 33.83 (27.31) 




                                                          
21
 Again a sample with N=154 for 2010 with countries already present in 1969 was constructed. Means are close 
to the data supplied in table 4 with the exception of Oceania where visa freedom is at 54.33 when three smaller 
countries are excluded (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste). Therefore, Australia and New Zea-
land exhibit a growth of visa-free travel possibilities. 
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Figures: 
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Figure 5. Countries with the highest gains or loss of visa-free travel possibilities from 1969 to 
2010 
 
 
